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Internet gambling and betting services: When the GATS’
rules are not applied due to the public morals/public
order exception. What lessons can be learnt?
Marı́a Verónica Pérez Asinari1
Belgium
a b s t r a c t
This paper explores the issues arising from a complaint made by Antigua and Barbuda
(Antigua) to a World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Resolution Panel. This concerned
US State and Federal law regulation that allegedly made it unlawful for suppliers, located
outside the United States (US), to supply Internet gambling and betting services to
consumers in the United States. As such, this called into question the application of the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). This is the first reported instance of the
WTO procedure in the digital environment.
ª 2006 Marı́a Verónica Pérez Asinari. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Internet gambling (remote supply of) is an on-going flourishing
business. Whoever surfs on the Internet, unless he/she uses fil-
ters or a browser that restricts pop-up windows and banners,may have seen numerous invitations to take part in these kinds
of activities. The revenues generated by this market are colos-
sal2 (with taxes applicable to luxury products in some jurisdic-
tions).3 However, in principle, governments tend to be
restrictive in their approach to gambling, especially to1 When the article was written the author was working as a Senior Research fellow at the Centre de Recherches Informatique et Droit
(CRID), University of Namur, Belgium, www.crid.be. She currently works at the European Data Protection Supervisor Office of the EU
as a Legal adviser, www.edps.europa.eu, maria.perezasinari@edps.europa.eu. This article expresses only the personal opinion of the
author. It has been published in French at Revue du Droit des Technologies de l’Information, Larcier, Belgium. The author would like to thank
Prof. Dr. Yves Poullet for the valuable comments given on this paper.
2 ‘‘In a recent report, gaming analysts estimate that in 2003 revenues from Internet gambling industry-wide will be $5.0 billion, or
approximately 4.3 percent of the total $116 billion in business-to-consumer global e-commerce. In the view of gaming analysts, the in-
ternational markets (non-US customers) represent the future of the industry’s growth’’, United States General Accounting Office, Report
to Congressional Requesters, Internet Gambling. An Overview of the Issues, December 2002, p.6, available at: www.gao.gov/new.items/
d0389.pdf, last visited 27-04-2005.
3 ‘‘(.) Great Britain taxes legal betting operations very heavily. Some of the best known operators are moving to other parts of the
British Commonwealth. Ladbrokes, for example, calls itself the world’s biggest bookmaker. Its website is licensed by the government
of Gibraltar. Ladbrokes.com, launched in February 2000, highlights repeatedly that bettors pay no tax. The loss of not just future tax
revenue from online wagers but existing tax revenue from wagers placed by telephone and in person is forcing the government to
reexamine its present position of simply ignoring Internet gambling’’, Nelson Rose, ‘‘Gambling and the Law: The Future Legal Landscape
for Internet Gambling’’, available at: www.gamblingandthelaw.com/antigua.html, last visited 27-04-2005.
0267-3649/$ – see front matter ª 2006 Marı́a Verónica Pérez Asinari. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.clsr.2006.03.003
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monopolies4 andtheyseecross-bordergambling asa facilitator
of crime or harmful conduct that challenges society’s public
morals.5
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has intervened in a num-
ber of cases in this regard, even before the explosion of the in-
dustry on the Internet. Most of the cases concerned obstacles
existing in Member States to the freedom to provide such ser-
vices. However, the ECJ, in the Schindler case, deemed that ‘‘[t]he
Treaty provisions relating to freedom to provide services do
not preclude [national] legislation (.), in view of the concerns
of social policy and of the prevention of fraud which justify it’’.6
The Läärä case was decided on similar terms.7 In later cases,
such as Zenatti8 and Gambelli,9 the ECJ discussed the need for
proportionality in the restrictions imposed, in the light of the
aims which might justify their adoption.
Recently, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) has been requested to solve
4 For instance, Denmark has adopted the Danish Act on Certain
Games, Lotteries and Bets. It renders illegal for any service pro-
vider, operating under a gambling licence of another Member
State than Denmark, to advertise, facilitate participation in or
supply gaming services. See: European Commission Press
Releases, ‘‘Free movement of services: Commission inquires




5 ‘‘Representatives of law enforcement agencies, regulatory
bodies, and the credit card and gaming industries expressed
mixed views regarding the vulnerability of Internet gambling to
money laundering. Law enforcement officials said they believed
that Internet gambling could potentially be a powerful vehicle
for laundering criminal proceeds at the relatively obscure
‘‘layering’’ stage of money laundering. They cited several charac-
teristics of Internet gambling that they believed made it vulnera-
ble to money laundering, including the volume, speed, and
international reach of Internet transactions and the offshore
locations of Internet gambling sites. In their view, these charac-
teristics promoted a high level of anonymity and gave rise to
complex jurisdictional issues. Law enforcement officials
acknowledged the lack of adjudicated cases involving money
laundering through Internet gambling sites but cited what they
believed to be contributing factors, including the lack of any in-
dustry regulations or oversight. Banking and gaming regulatory
officials did not view Internet gambling as being particularly
susceptible to money laundering, especially when credit cards,
which create a transaction record and are subject to relatively
low transaction limits, are used for payment. Likewise, credit
card and gaming industry officials did not believe Internet gam-
bling posed any particular risks in terms of money laundering.
Gaming industry officials did not believe that Internet gambling
was any more or less susceptible to money laundering than other
types of electronic commerce and pointed out that, in their view,
the financial industry, which is responsible for the payments
system, is better suited to monitoring for suspicious activity in
the area than the gaming industry itself’’, United States General
Accounting Office, Internet Gambling. An Overview of the Issues,
December 2002, p. 5.
6 ECJ, Case C-275/92.
7 ECJ, Case C-124/97.
8 ECJ, Case C-67/98.
9 ECJ, Case C-243/01.a case concerning objections to the limitation upon cross-
border provision of Internet gambling and betting services.10
For the very first time, the WTO Appellate Body was called
upon to address the general exception provision of the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), contained
in Article XIV. Moreover, it is the first time that a ‘‘public
morals’’ exception has been considered at WTO level
(e.g. GATT).11 Article XIV GATS foresees the possibility for
a Member State not to apply the GATS rules if certain
conditions are given, provided that public policy objectives
are at stake.
This paper will evaluate, firstly, the methodology
followed by the WTO Appellate Body for the decision-making
in the present case through the application of Article XIV
GATS. The terms of reasoning followed by the Appellate
Body are of high importance for Member States in conducting
risk-assessment procedures when adopting measures that
would otherwise constitute a barrier to trade, but respond to
a relevant public policy objective. Companies willing to
provide e-services12 that may be blocked due to this kind of
barrier may also assess the right of the country in question
to impose such obstacles, in the light of the requisites
described in the methodology. Up to now, exceptions had
been invoked in cases where scientific evidence could be
considered, such as health or environmental cases. However,
societies may make political choices that are based on
ethics, history, and fundamental rights, etc. It has to be
noted that the increase in e-services, that are trans-national
in nature, will concomitantly augment the need to proceed
with such an assessment, particularly in those areas
where commitments have been made under the GATS
framework.
Secondly, the paper reflects on the relevance of this case in
relation to the role of the WTO as far as Internet regulation is
concerned. The likelihood of deeper political integration
within the framework of WTO seems remote, so discussion
will focus on ‘‘Internet regulation’’ in general. Thus, the use
of an ‘‘exceptions mechanism’’ in those areas excluded from
its current application would be the preferable methodology
if further rules are to be adopted to deal with e-commerce is-
sues, such as those related to trade in goods, services, and in-
tellectual property.
10 WTO, Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting
the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/
AB/R, 7 April 2005, available at: www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
dispu_e/285abr_e.pdf, last visited 02-05-2005. See also: WTO,
Report of the Panel, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-
Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/R, 10
November 2004, available at: www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
dispu_e/285r_e.pdf, last visited 02-05-2005.
11 For a comprehensive study about the moral exception in Article
XX GATT, see: Steve Charnovitz, ‘‘The Moral Exception in Trade
Policy’’, Virginia Journal of International Law, Summer 1998, available
at: www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/charnovitzmoral.pdf.
12 Since private parties have no possibility to claim at WTO level,
the e-services sector has to be quite significant for a country to
bring the case to the DSB.
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Antigua and Barbuda (Antigua) submitted a complaint to
a WTO Panel concerning measures of state13 and federal
law that allegedly made it unlawful for suppliers, located
13 The consideration of state laws has been rejected by the
DSB.
14 The relevant part of the Wire Act (18 U.S.C x 1084) states:
‘‘Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering
knowingly uses a wire communication facility for the transmis-
sion in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers or infor-
mation assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on any sporting
event or contest, or for the transmission of a wire communication
which entitles the recipient to receive money or credit as a result
of bets or wagers, or for information assisting in the placing of
bets or wagers shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than two years, or both.’’In relation to the Travel Act (18
U:S:C x 1952), the following part was quoted:
‘‘ (a) Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses
the mail or any facility in interstate or foreign commerce,
with intent to –
(1) distribute the proceeds of any unlawful activity; or
(2) commit any crime of violence to further any unlawful
activity; or
(3) otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facili-
tate the promotion, management, establishment, or car-
rying on, of any unlawful activity, and thereafter
performs or attempts to perform –
(A) an act described in paragraph (1) or (3) shall be fined
under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or
both; or
(B) an act described in paragraph (2) shall be fined under
this title, imprisoned for not more than 20 years, or
both, and if death results shall be imprisoned for any
term of years or for life.
(b) As used in this section (i) ‘‘unlawful activity’’ means (1) any
business enterprise involving gambling . in violation of the
laws of the State in which they are committed or of the United
States.’’14
The relevant part of the Illegal Gambling Business Act (18 U.S.C x
1955) has been pointed out to be the following:
‘‘ (a) Whoever conducts, finances, manages, supervises, directs or
owns all or part of an illegal gambling business shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
(b) As used in this section –
(1) ‘illegal gambling business’ means a gambling business
which –
(i) is a violation of the law of a State or political subdivi-
sion in which it is conducted;
(ii) involves five or more persons who conduct, finance,
manage, supervise, direct, or own all or part of such
business; and
(iii) has been or remains in substantially continuous oper-
ation for a period in excess of thirty days or has a gross
revenue of $2,000 in any single day.
(2) ‘gambling’ includes but is not limited to pool-selling,
bookmaking, maintaining slot machines, roulette wheels
or dice tables, and conducting lotteries, policy, bolita or
numbers games, or selling chances therein.’’outside the United States (US), to supply gambling and betting
services to consumers in the United States. Antigua claimed
that the restrictions imposed by the US, through federal
and state laws, resulted in a ‘‘total prohibition’’ on the
cross-border supply of the said services, contrary to US
obligations under the GATS. Antigua asserted that the GATS
Schedule, in respect of the US, included specific commit-
ments on gambling and betting services. Thus, Antigua
argued that, since the US had made full market access and
national treatment commitments, in maintaining the mea-
sures at issue the US was acting in breach of its obligations
under the GATS Schedule, as well as under Articles VI, XI,
XVI, and XVII of the GATS.
The federal statutes under scrutiny were the Wire Act, the
Travel Act and the Illegal Gambling Business Act.14 The US
maintained that it excluded ‘‘sports’’ from its commitments,
which included ‘‘gambling’’ in its ordinary meaning. It also
argued that none of the laws imposed a limitation on the
number of service suppliers ‘‘in the form of numerical quotas’’
or limitations on service operations or output ‘‘expressed as
designated numerical units in the form of quotas’’. Further-
more, said the US, those laws were justified under paragraphs
(a) and (c) of Article XIV of the GATS.
3. Methodology for the application of Article
XIV GATS exceptions
In a previous paper,15 following an assessment of the
application made by the DSB of Article XX GATT’ excep-
tions, a four-step methodology has been proposed for han-
dling exceptions to the WTO rules. The steps are the
following:
 First step: determine whether the measure under discussion
is inconsistent with a GATS’ provision;
 Second step: evaluate whether ‘‘the laws or regulations with
which compliance is being secured are themselves ‘not in-
consistent’ with the General Agreement’’;
 Third step: evaluate whether the measures are ‘‘necessary to
secure compliance’’ with those laws or regulations;
15 Marı́a Verónica Pérez Asinari, ‘‘The WTO and the Protection of
Personal Data. Do EU Measures Fall within GATS Exception?
Which Future for Data Protection within the WTO e-Commerce
Context?’’ BILETA Conference, Controlling Information in the Online
Environment, Institute of Computer & Communications law,
Queen Mary, University of London, London, 14 and 15 April
2003, available at: www.bileta.ac.uk/03papers/perez.html, last
visited 20-01-2005. See also: Marı́a Verónica Perez Asinari, ‘‘Is
there any Room for Privacy and Data Protection within the
WTO Rules?’’, The Electronic Communications Law Review, vol. 9, n.
4, 2002, pp. 249–280. The cases analyzed in those papers were:
‘‘United States – Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930’’, ‘‘Thailand –
Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes’’, -
‘‘United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline’’, ‘‘Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled
and Frozen Beef’’, -‘‘United States – Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products’’, etc.
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in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the
same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on inter-
national trade’’.
However, in the case of the GATS, an enquiry as to
whether the country in question has made any specific
commitments in the service sector under discussion must
precede the application of the four-step methodology.16
Also, with regard to ‘‘Most-Favoured Nation Treatment’’,
consideration must be given as to whether the member
can maintain a measure inconsistent with that status, on
the basis that such a measure is listed in, and meets the
conditions within the Annex dealing with Article II
Exemptions.
This paper will examine the findings of the Appellate Body
in the present case to the extent that these are relevant to an
evaluation of the methodology that follows on from the appli-
cation of the exception.
3.1. Findings of the Appellate Body
The Appellate Body began with the arguments of the partici-
pants. It then proceeded to analyse the points raised in the
Appeal: (a) the measures at issue; (b) the interpretation of
the specific commitments made by the US in its GATS Sched-
ule; (c) the Article XVI of the GATS: market access; and (d) the
Article XIV of the GATS: general exceptions. Given this sce-
nario, it is possible to assess how the Appellate Body has
used the methodology for the application of Article XIV
GATS exceptions. In what follows, a summary is made of its
findings.
3.1.1. Measures at issue
First of all, the parties disputed the ‘‘measure’’ being
challenged. Thus, the Appellate Body reviewed the Panel
16 ‘‘It is only by reference to a country’s schedule, and
(where relevant) its MFN exemption list, that it can be seen
to which services sectors and under what conditions the basic
principles of the GATS -market access, national treatment and
MFN treatment d apply within that country’s jurisdiction. The
schedules are complex documents in which each country iden-
tifies the service sectors to which it will apply the market ac-
cess and national treatment obligations of the GATS and any
exceptions from those obligations it wishes to maintain. The
commitments and limitations are in every case entered with
respect to each of the four modes of supply which constitute
the definition of trade in services in Article I of the GATS:
these are cross-border supply; consumption abroad; commer-
cial presence; and presence of natural persons (.).In order to
determine the real level of market access represented by a
given schedule it is therefore necessary to examine the range
of activities covered in each service sector and the limitations
on market access and national treatment pertaining to the
different modes of supply. (.).’’, World Trade Organization,
‘‘Guide to reading the GATS schedules of specific commitments
and the list of article II (MFN) exemptions’’, available at:
www.wto.int/english/tratop_e/serv_e/guide1_e.htm, last visited
21-04-2005.finding that a ‘‘‘total prohibition’ on the cross-border supply
of gambling and betting services’’ could not constitute an
autonomous measure that could be challenged per se. Sec-
ond, it considered whether a practise could be understood
as an autonomous measure if it could be challenged in
and of itself. Third, it evaluated the US’ allegation that
Antigua failed to make a prima facie case of inconsistency
with Article XVI in regard to Federal and State laws and
that, therefore, the Panel should not have ruled on these
claims.
Finally, the Appellate Body considered whether the Panel
had erred or not in examining whether the Wire Act, the
Travel Act and the Illegal Gambling Business Act were consis-
tent with the US obligations under Article XVI. It would then
be possible to consider whether the relevant measures could
eventually affect cross-border supply of gambling and betting
services.
3.1.2. Interpretation of the specific commitments made
by the US in its GATS Schedule
The US appealed the finding that maintained that its
Schedule under the GATS included specific commitments
on gambling and betting services under subsection
10.D. The US argued that, by excluding ‘‘sporting’’
services from the scope of subsection 10.D of its GATS
Schedule, it excluded gambling and betting services from
the scope of the specific commitments that it undertook
therein.
The Appellate Body made use of Articles 31 and 32 of
the Vienna Convention and concluded that a proper inter-
pretation, according to the principles codified in those legal
rules, led to the same result that the Panel had reached.
Thus, the US GATS Schedule had to be understood as mak-
ing a specific commitment with regard to gambling and bet-
ting services.
3.1.3. Article XVI of the GATS: market access
Article XVI GATS reads as follows:
‘‘1. With respect to market access through the modes of
supply identified in Article I, each Member shall accord
services and service suppliers of any other Member treat-
ment no less favourable than that provided for under the
terms, limitations and conditions agreed and specified in
its Schedule.
2. In sectors where market-access commitments are under-
taken, the measures which a Member shall not maintain
or adopt either on the basis of a regional subdivision or
on the basis of its entire territory, unless otherwise spec-
ified in its Schedule, are defined as:
(a) limitations on the number of service suppliers
whether in the form of numerical quotas, monopolies,
exclusive service suppliers or the requirements of an
economic needs test;
(b) limitations on the total value of service transactions or
assets in the form of numerical quotas or the require-
ment of an economic needs test;
(c) limitations on the total number of service opera-
tions or on the total quantity of service output
c o m p u t e r l a w & s e c u r i t y r e p o r t 2 2 ( 2 0 0 6 ) 2 9 9 – 3 0 8 303The United States of America – schedule of specific commitments Modes of supply: 1) Cross-border supply; 2) Consumption abroad; 3)
Commercial presence; 4) Presence of natural persons










10. Recreational, cultural, & sporting services
A. Entertainment
services (including
theatre, live bands and
circus services)
1) None 1) None
2) None 2) None
3) None 3) None




B. News agency services 1) None 1) None
2) None 2) None
3) None 3) None
4) Unbound, except






1) None 1) None
2) None 2) None
3) None 3) None
4) Unbound, except





1) None 1) None
2) None 2) None
3) The number of
concessions available
for commercial operations
in federal, state and local
facilities is limited
3) None
4) Unbound, except as
indicated in the
horizontal section
4) Noneexpressed in terms of designated numerical units in
the form of quotas or the requirement of an economic
needs test;
(d) limitations on the total number of natural persons that
may be employed in a particular service sector or that
a service supplier may employ and who are necessary
for, and directly related to, the supply of a specific
service in the form of numerical quotas or the require-
ment of an economic needs test;
(e) measures which restrict or require specific types of
legal entity or joint venture through which a service
supplier may supply a service; and
(f) limitations on the participation of foreign capital
in terms of maximum percentage limit on foreign
shareholding or the total value of individual or aggre-
gate foreign investment.’’17
17 General Agreement on Trade in Services, available at: www.
wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/26-gats_01_e.htm#ftnt8, last vis-
ited 25-04-2005.This Article enumerates certain obligations of market
access that Member States must fulfill when they make spe-
cific commitments. Having stated that the US had made
such commitments vis-à-vis the gambling and betting sector,
the Panel considered the consistency of the measures at issue
against the US obligations under Article XVI.
Antigua claimed that the measures at issue prohibited
cross-border supply of gambling and betting services, repre-
senting a quantitative limitation within the scope of sub-
paragraphs (a) and (c) of Article XVI. The Panel considered
that the prohibition resulted in a ‘‘zero quota’’ and, therefore,
constituted a limitation on the number of service suppliers in
the form of numerical quotas within the meaning of Article
XVI:2(a). It also represented a limitation on the total number
of service operations or on the total quantity of service output
in the form of quotas within the meaning of Article XVI:2(c).
The US appealed the Panel’s interpretation, emphasizing
that none of the measures at issue stated any numerical units
or was in the form of quotas.
The Appellate Body concluded that the limitations
amounting to a zero quota were quantitative limitations
and fell within the scope of Article XVI:2(a) and (c).
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issue.
3.1.4. Article XIV of the GATS: general exceptions
Finally, the Appellate Body analyzed the US defence under
Article XIV of the GATS. The Article reads as follows:
‘‘Subject to the requirement that such measures are not
applied in a manner which would constitute a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries
where like conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on
trade in services, nothing in this Agreement shall be con-
strued to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any
Member of measures:
(a) necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public
order;
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health;
(c) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regula-
tions which are not inconsistent with the provisions
of this Agreement including those relating to:
(i) the prevention of deceptive and fraudulent prac-
tices or to deal with the effects of a default on ser-
vices contracts;
(ii) the protection of the privacy of individuals in rela-
tion to the processing and dissemination of per-
sonal data and the protection of confidentiality of
individual records and accounts;
(iii) safety;
(d) inconsistent with Article XVII, provided that the dif-
ference in treatment is aimed at ensuring the equita-
ble or effective imposition or collection of direct
taxes in respect of services or service suppliers of
other Members;
(e) inconsistent with Article II, provided that the difference
in treatment is the result of an agreement on the avoid-
ance of double taxation or provisions on the avoidance
of double taxation in any other international agreement
or arrangement by which the Member is bound.’’18
3.1.4.1. Justification of the measures under paragraph (a) of
Article XIV. This rule covers ‘‘measures . necessary to pro-
tect public morals or to maintain public order’’. The Panel
found that the Federal Acts were measures of that kind. How-
ever, Antigua disagreed, mainly on the grounds that the Panel
failed to determine whether the concerns identified by the US
(‘‘money laundering, organized crime, fraud, underage gam-
bling and pathological gambling’’)19 satisfied the standard
set out in footnote 5 to Article XIV(a) of the GATS: ‘‘[t]he public
order exception may be invoked only where a genuine and
sufficiently serious threat is posed to one of the fundamental
interests of society’’.
The Appellate Body deemed that the Panel was not re-
quired, in addition, to make a separate, explicit determination
that the standard of footnote 5 had been met.
18 General Agreement on Trade in Services.
19 Panel’s Report, para. 6.486.In the second part of its analysis, the Panel examined the
‘‘necessity’’ of the Wire Act, the Travel Act and the IGBA Act.
It found that the US had not demonstrated the ‘‘necessity’’
of the measures. This finding was based in the following
reasoning: (i) the interests and values protected by the
mentioned Acts served very important societal interests that
could be characterized as ‘‘vital and important in the highest
degree’’; (ii) those Acts ‘‘must contribute, at least to some
extent’’, to addressing the US’ concerns ‘‘pertaining to money
laundering, organized crime, fraud, underage gambling and
pathological gambling’’; (iii) the measures in question ‘‘have
a significant restrictive trade impact’’; (iv) ‘‘[i]n rejecting
Antigua’s invitation to engage in bilateral or multilateral
consultations and/or negotiations, the US failed to pursue, in
good faith, a course of action that could have been used by it
to explore the possibility of finding a reasonably available
WTO-consistent alternative’’. Each party appealed different
parts of this analysis.
With regard to the determination of ‘‘necessity’’, the Ap-
pellate Body asserted that a Member’s characterization of
a measure’s objectives and of the effectiveness of its regula-
tory approach – as evidenced, for example, by texts of statutes,
legislative history, and pronouncements of government
agencies or officials – was relevant to an objective determina-
tion of its necessity. However, a Panel was not bound by these
characterizations, and could search for evidence in other ele-
ments. The necessity to act implied that there was no ‘‘rea-
sonably available’’ WTO-consistent alternative available to
the responding member that could preserve its right to
achieve the desired level of protection.
The Appellate Body added:
‘‘311. If, however, the complaining party raises a WTO-
consistent alternative measure then, in its view, the re-
sponding party will be required to demonstrate why its
challenged measure nevertheless remains ‘necessary’ in
the light of that alternative or, in other words, why the
proposed alternative is not, in fact, ‘reasonably available’.
If a responding party demonstrates that the alternative is
not ‘reasonably available’, in the light of the interests or
values being pursued and the party’s desired level of pro-
tection, it follows that the challenged measure must be
‘necessary’ within the terms of Article XIV(a) of the
GATS’’.
Furthermore, the Appellate Body found that the necessity
of the three statutes should not be assessed against the possi-
bility of consultations with Antigua, because such consulta-
tions could not qualify as a reasonably available alternative
measure with which a challenged measure should be
compared.
Following these preliminary considerations, the ‘‘neces-
sity’’ of the statutes ‘‘themselves’’ was studied. Whereas the
Panel recognized the ‘‘significant trade impact’’ of the Federal
Statutes, it tempered this recognition by enumerating charac-
teristics and concerns derived from the remote supply of gam-
bling and betting services. That is: (i) the volume, speed and
international reach of remote gambling transactions; (ii) the
virtual anonymity of such transactions; (iii) low barriers to
entry in the context of the remote supply of gambling and
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ment in which such gambling took place.20
The Appellate Body judged that this analysis showed
that the Panel placed more weight upon the circumstances
mentioned than upon the restrictive trade impact. More-
over, whilst no reasonable alternative measure had been
proposed by Antigua or examined by the Panel, and given
that the US had made its prima facie case of ‘‘necessity’’,
the Appellate Body concluded that the US had successfully
demonstrated that its statutes were ‘‘necessary’’, and
therefore justified, under paragraph (a) of Article XIV of
GATs.
3.1.4.2. The guise of Article XIV. Antigua alleged that the
Panel had erred by focusing its discussion under the guise
of remote supply of gambling services rather than on the en-
tire gambling industry. The Appellate Body deemed that,
since it was indeed the remote supply of gambling that gave
rise to particular concerns, there was no error in maintaining
such a distinction for the purpose of analyzing any possible
discrimination in the application of the three Federal
Statutes.
The Appellate Body then considered two instances which
allegedly showed that the measures at issue discriminated be-
tween domestic and foreign service suppliers, contrary to the
defence asserted by the US under this interpretation. The first
instance was based on ‘‘inconclusive’’ evidence of the alleged
non-enforcement of the three Federal Statutes. It was consid-
ered that the proper significance to be attached to isolated in-
stances of enforcement could not be determinative. The
finding was consequently reversed.
The second instance was based on the ‘‘ambiguity relat-
ing to’’ the scope of application of the Interstate Horserac-
ing Act (IHA), which could be understood as permitting
certain types of remote betting on horseracing within the
US. As such, this could result in a difference between the
measures applied to foreign and domestic service suppliers
of remote betting services for horseracing. The Appellate
Body argued that the US could have chosen, but did not,
to put forward an additional argument that even if such
discrimination existed, it did not rise to the level of ‘‘arbi-
trary’’ or ‘‘unjustifiable’’ discrimination. For that reason,
the Appellate Body found that the US had not shown that
these measures satisfied the requirements of the Article
XIV interpretation. In consequence, the Appellate Body rec-
ommended that the Dispute Settlement Body request the
US to bring these measures into conformity with its obliga-
tions under the GATS.
3.2. Consistency of the methodology followed
in the present case with previous assessments of
Article XX exceptions. Reflections for the construction
of a (new) pattern for risk assessment
If a comparison is made with the four-step methodology
used in cases where Article XX GATT applies, consistency
20 Surprisingly enough, those characteristics and concerns are so
neutral that could, indeed, be applied to a myriad of international
e-services.can be found with the evaluation conducted for the
application of Article XIV GATS. In this last case, it is
possible to refer to it as a five-step methodology, since
the very first issue to check is whether commitments
have been made in the specific service sector being
assessed.
From now on, with the increase of e-services, exceptions
to the application of the WTO rules due to national public
policy objectives were likely to be invoked more often. If
so then has the Appellate Body’s decision left some new
clues for use in evaluating the application of the excep-
tions’ rule? What follows is a five-step methodology
designed to assess the question step-by-step. This is
intended to clarify which pattern would likely be followed
for the application of an Article XIV GATS exception. As
such this constitutes a tool for risk assessment in cases
of adoption of measures that might violate WTO rules in
the e-services sector.
 First step: determine whether specific commitments have
been made in the service sector under analysis, or
whether the member can maintain a measure in-
consistent with the ‘‘Most-favoured Nation treatment’’
principle, provided that such a measure is listed in, and
meets the conditions of, the Annex on Article II
Exemptions.
The Appellate Body understood the extent of the
commitment under scrutiny in a broad way, resulting in the
affirmation of the existence of such a commitment.
 Second step: determine whether the measure under
discussion is inconsistent with a GATS’ provision.
Under this step the Appellate Body has left a clear ‘‘clue’’:
a ‘‘total prohibition’’ is equivalent to a ‘‘zero quota’’ under
Article XVI GATS. Here again, as in the first step, the reasoning
has been such as to include the measures analyzed within the
scope of the GATS.
 Third step: evaluate whether ‘‘the laws or regulations with
which compliance is being secured are themselves ‘not
inconsistent’ with the General Agreement’’.
The Appellate Body has not considered this step in the
present case, which was previously analyzed in cases of
Article XX GATT application. It must be noted, indeed, that
this step is used when paragraph (c) of Article XIV GATS is
being scrutinized.
 Fourth step: evaluate whether the measures are ‘‘neces-
sary to secure compliance’’ with those laws or
regulations.
Under this step, the Panel evaluated, as a preliminary
issue, whether the measures were of the kind to ‘‘protect
public morals or to maintain public order’’. This is a correct
approach, which has to be guided by footnote 5, even if, as
pointed out by the Appellate Body, this footnote does not
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mination that its standard has been met.21
Another important clue is the rejection of the need to en-
gage in bilateral or multilateral consultations as a prerequisite
to determine the non-existence of ‘‘reasonably available
WTO-consistent alternatives’’.
 Fifth step: assess whether the measures are ‘‘not applied in
a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the
same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on inter-
national trade’’.
As far as the fifth step is concerned, the ‘‘lesson’’ left by
the Appellate Body is that the non-enforcement of national
infringements to the law that is being enforced against
third countries’ providers must constitute a clear pattern of
conduct to be considered as an ‘‘arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination’’. On the contrary, when the discrimination
emanates from the wording of the Act itself, having being
invoked by one party, the defendant has to demonstrate that
such discrimination, even if existing, is justified for a given
public policy reason, and therefore, it is not ‘‘arbitrary or
unjustifiable’’.
4. The WTO and Internet regulation
When the use of the Internet as a tool to practice commerce
commenced, the doctrine seemed to be in awe due to the
Internet’s absence of borders or ‘‘geographic indetermi-
nacy’’. In any case, the question arises as to ‘‘what should
be (if any) the regulatory model for the Internet?’’ This
emblematic question seduced specialists of many different
legal branches, and also sociologists, philosophers,
economists, political scientists, computer scientists, as well
as national governments, and international organizations,
etc.22
21 The Panel interpreted the meaning of those terms. ‘‘Public
morals’’, it said, ‘‘denotes standards of right and wrong conduct
maintained by or on behalf of a community or nation’’ (para. 6.
465 of the Panel’s Report). The term ‘‘public order’’ was analyzed
literally, instead of interpreting it as the US has made, that is, as
the civil law concept of ordre public, which functional counterpart
in common law systems is the concept of ‘‘public policy’’. It fur-
ther added: ‘‘Based on the dictionary definitions referred to above
and taking into account the clarification added by the drafters of
the GATS in footnote 5, we believe that ‘public morals’ and ‘public
order’ are two distint concepts under Article XIV(a) of the GATS.
Nevertheless, to the extent that both concepts seek to protect
largely similar values, some overlap exists’’ (para. 6.468 of the
Panel’s Report).
22 See: Jacques Berleur and Yves Poullet, ‘‘Quelles R-régulaions
pour L’Internet?’’, in Gouvernance de la Societé de l’Information, Ca-
hiers du Centre de Recherches Informatique et Droit n. 22, Bruy-
lant, Bruxelles, Presses Universitaires de Namur, Namur, 2002,
pp. 133–151. Philippe AMBLARD, Régulation de l’Internet, Cahiers
du Centre de Recherches Informatique et Droit n. 24, Bruylant,
Bruxelles, 2004.A ‘‘declaration of the independence of cyberspace’’23 was
issued, as the paradigm of a strong commitment (or desire)
to maintain the Internet as an ephemeral place lacking regula-
tion, where the sole premise for interaction was ‘‘freedom’’.
Another sound (and again paradigmatic) answer stressed
the concept of.: ‘‘code’’24 or ‘‘lex informatica’’.25 Yet
another response was ‘‘self-regulation’’: industry-led regula-
tion was preferred to State regulation. This last approach
was mainly supported by the US government;26 multinationals
acting on-line (and represented, for instance, by the ICC27);
and certain very particular private entities (such as ICANN28
and CBDe29).
However, reality showed that those initiatives alone could
not always constitute an adequate answer when important
interests of society were being threatened or when certain
activities carried out in cyberspace had consequences in
a ‘‘known place’’ affecting ‘‘known individuals’’. In some
cases, even the responsibility of the State could be involved,
for instance, as the guarantor of fundamental rights that are
at stake on the net, as in the case of privacy and personal
data protection.
The Libertarian approach seems to be increasingly re-
stricted. The ‘‘declaration of the independence of cyber-
space’’ started to water down some years ago. Even if the
enforcement of the law in Internet cases was rather difficult,
States tend to make no distinction between their jurisdiction
within the territory where they have sovereignty, and the
23 John Perry Barlow, ‘‘A Declaration of the Independence of Cy-
berspace’’, 8 February 1996, available at: homes.eff.org/wbarlow/
Declaration-Final.html, last visited 27-04-2005.
24 Laurence Lessig, Code and other laws of cyberspace, Basic Books,
New York, 1999. Laurence Lessig, ‘‘The Law of the Horse: What
Cyberlaw might Teach’’, Harvard Law Review, vol. 113, 1999, p.
501–546.
25 Joel R. Reidenberg, ‘‘Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Infor-
mation Policy Rules Through Technology’’, Texas Law Review, vol.
76, n. 3, 1998, p. 553–584.
26 The White House, ‘‘A Framework for Global Electronic Com-
merce’’, 1 July 1997, available at: www.technology.gov/digecon-
omy/framewrk.htm, last visited 27-04-2005. The first principle
developed was ‘‘[t]he private sector should lead’’, and the second
one ‘‘[g]overnments should avoid undue restrictions on electronic
commerce’’.
27 International Chamber of Commerce, A Global Action Plan for
Electronic Business, 3rd Edition, July 2002, available at: www.
iccwbo.org/home/e_business/3rd%20Edition%20Global%20Action%
20Plan%20no%20annex.pdf, last visited 27-04-2005. Some of the
principles enunciated are: ‘‘The development of electronic busi-
ness should be led primarily by the private sector in response
to market forces’’, ‘‘Government intervention, when required,
should promote a stable, international legal environment, allow
a fair allocation of scarce resources and protect public interest.
Such intervention should be no more than is essential and should
be clear, transparent, objective, non-discriminatory, propor-
tional, flexible, and technologically neutral’’, p. 9.
28 Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, see:
www.icann.org/.
29 Global Business Dialogue on Electronic Commerce, see: www.
gbde.org/.
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when their national security is under threat.30
In December 2003, the World Summit on the Information
Society took place in Geneva, under the auspices of the United
Nations and the International Telecommunication Union. A
balanced approach to the regulation of the Internet, and the
Information Society in general, was advocated. The promo-
tion of a sustainable development and the respect of human
rights and fundamental freedoms in the digital environment
were reaffirmed.31
Given this scenario, the question arises what would be the
role of the WTO in the regulation of the Internet? It is suggested
that, for the time being, it is actually not appropriate to speak
about ‘‘Internet regulation’’ in the context of the WTO, since it
is quite a broad term that involves material aspects that are out-
side the competence of this organization. Hitherto, the WTO can
only play a role in the field of e-commerce, with the same exten-
sion and limits as it has in the GATT, GATS and TRIPS.
Whether the existing WTO framework is adequate or not to
answer to e-commerce specificities and challenges has been
discussed.32 However, to date, the WTO has not given any of-
ficial answer. In 2001, the Doha Declaration (Fourth Mini-
sterial Conference in Doha, Qatar)33 included a mandate
for negotiation on a series of issues, one of them being
e-commerce. Previously, the Geneva Declaration (Second Min-
isterial Conference in Geneva, Switzerland, 1998)34 had estab-
lished a work program to examine all trade-related issues
arising from global electronic commerce. A report on further
progress should have been done in Cancun (Fifth Ministerial
Conference, Cancun, Mexico, 2003).35 To date, no concrete re-
sults have been achieved, on this issue, from this Conference.
30 Yahoo! case, T.G.I. Paris, Nov. 20, 2000, see: www.juriscom.
net/txt/jurisfr/cti/tgiparis20001120.pdf. US Patriot Act, Sec. 217
(see: Sec. 1030: ‘‘the term ‘protected computer’ means a
computer - (.) or (B) which is used in interstate or foreign com-
merce or communication, including a computer located outside
the United States that is used in a manner that affects interstate
or foreign commerce or communication of the United States;’’),
US Can Spam Act, Sec. 12. Restrictions on other transmissions:
‘‘Section 227(b)(1) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C.
227(b)(1)) is amended, in the matter preceding subparagraph (A),
by inserting ‘, or any person outside the United States if the recip-
ient is within the United States’ after ‘United States’’’, available
at: www.spamlaws.com/federal/108s877.shtml. See also: Joel R.
Reidenberg, ‘‘Technology and Internet Jurisdiction’’, 153 Univ. of
Penn. L. Rev., 1951 (2005). Joel R. Reidenberg, ‘‘States and Internet
Enforcement’’, 1 Univ. Ottawa Tech. L. J. 213 (2004).
31 Déclaration de principes, Construire la société de l’informa-
tion: un défi mondial pour le nouveau millénaire, Document
WSIS-03/GENEVA/DOC/4-F, 12 mai 2004, available at: www.itu.
int/dms_pub/itu-s/md/03/wsis/doc/S03-WSIS-DOC-0004!!MSW-F.
doc, last visited 10-10-2005.
32 Heinz Hauser and Sacha Wunsch-Vincent, ‘‘A Call for a WTO
E-Commerce Initiative’’, International Journal of Communications
Law and Policy, Issue 6, Winter 2000/2001. Sacha Wunsch-Vincent,
‘‘Elecronic Services: Its Regulatory Barriers and the Role of the
WTO’’, University of St. Gallen, July 2001.
33 The Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference, see: www.wto.org/
english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/min01_e.htm.
34 The Second WTO Ministerial Conference, see: www.wto.org/
english/thewto_e/minist_e/min98_e/min98_e.htm.
35 The Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference, see: www.wto.org/english/
thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/min03_e.htm.The very spectrum of e-commerce involves issues that are
not purely ‘‘trade-related’’. For example, the Geneva Declara-
tion included, as one of the topics to be discussed, ‘‘privacy
and data protection’’. Indeed, those topics are considered to
be of a human rights nature in some Member States (e.g.
Europe and Latin American countries). Thus, what attitude
is the WTO likely to assume on such matters?
A wide doctrinal discussion on international trade and
human rights has taken place during the last years.36 Such dis-
cussion has had widespread consequences for what has been
called the ‘‘legitimacy crisis of the WTO’’.37 Notwithstanding,
it seems that in the near future at least, it is improbable that
the WTO would assume any active role in Internet regulation
or in non-trade related aspects of e-commerce. The case, ana-
lyzed here, has shown how those issues can be addressed via
the use of existing regulatory tools. If specific regulation was
adopted for e-commerce, which is a pending matter of discus-
sion and agreement on a clear position, the exception system,
as found in Article XIV GATS, should be maintained for those
non-trade related aspects. Any other approach would require
deeper political integration, which would be quite difficult to
achieve. For instance, the existing exception system allows
the EU to adopt certain restrictive measures to guarantee the
protection of the fundamental right to personal data. Any reg-
ulation at WTO level would risk softening the protection pro-
vided currently by EU legislation. That would happen, for
instance, if ‘‘privacy and personal data’’ were considered as
a ‘‘consumer right’’ in the e-commerce arena.
36 Mireille Delmas-Marty, ‘‘Commerce mondial et protection des
droits de l’homme’’, in World Trade and the Protection of Human
Rights, Institut René Cassin de Strasbourg, Bruylant, Bruxelles,
2001, pp. 1–19. Mireille Delmas-Marty, ‘‘Commerce mondial et
protection des droits de l’homme’’, in World Trade and the Protec-
tion of Human Rights, Institut René Cassin de Strasbourg, Bruylant,
Bruxelles, 2001, pp. 1–19. Thiébaut Flory and Nicolas Ligneul,
‘‘Commerce international, droits de l’homme, mondialisation:
les droits de l’homme et l’Organisation mondiale du Commerce’’,
in World Trade and the Protection of Human Rights, Institut René Cas-
sin de Strasbourg, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2001, pp. 179–192. Philip
Alston, ‘‘Resisting the Merger and Acquisition of Human Rights
by Trade Law: A Reply to Petersmann’’, European Journal of Interna-
tional Law, vol. 13, n. 4, (2002), pp. 815–844. Robert Howse,
‘‘Human Rights in the WTO: Whose Rights, What Humanity.
Comment on Petersmann’’, European Journal of International Law,
vol. 13, n. 3 (2002), pp. 651–660. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, ‘‘Taking
Human Dignity, Poverty and Empowerment of Individuals More
Seriously: Rejoinder to Alston’’, European Journal of International
Law, vol. 13, n. 4 (2002), pp. 845–852. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann,
‘‘The ‘Human Rights Approach to International Trade’ Advocated
by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and by the Inter-
national Labour Organization: Is it Relevant for WTO Law and Pol-
icy?’’, in Preparing the Doha Development Round: Challenges to the
Legitimacy and Efficiency of the World Trading System, Conference
Report, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European
University Institute, Florence, 2004.
37 Robert Howse, ‘‘How to Begin to Think About the ‘Democratic
Deficit’ at the WTO’’, available at: faculty.law.umich.edu/rhowse/
Drafts_and_Publications/house7.pdf. Robert Howse and Kalypso
Nicolaidis, ‘‘Enhancing WTO Legitimacy: Constitutionalization
or Global Subsidiarity?’’, in Marco Verweij and Tim Josling (eds),
Deliberately Democratizing Multilateral Organization, special issue
of Governance, vol. 16, Issue 1, pp. 73–94.
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The case analyzed in this paper is the first example of the ap-
plication of the Article XIV GATS exception, and furthermore,
is the first concrete example of WTO dispute resolution in the
digital environment. This paper has not discussed the appro-
priateness or otherwise of the legislation in question, but
rather, has tried to learn the lessons of the WTO approach to-
wards non-trade related matters that are implicit within the
development of e-services. Indeed, the way WTO rules are ap-
plied in the online sphere is not dramatically different than
the one applied in the offline world. A consistent approach
has been observed between previous applications of Article
XX GATT and the current application of Article XIV GATS.
This case has also illustrated the point that countries are not
obliged to abandon all their public policy measures and that
they can enforce these in the context of the Internet. Guidance
as to the limits of this ‘‘right to regulate’’ can be found in the
integral analysis of the use made of Article XX GATT and
Article XIV GATS (in the present case). This could eventually
allow the construction of a basic pattern for risk-assessmentprocedures. This could then be used as a ‘‘prior-checking’’
form of guidance for countries planning to adopt legislation
that might have a barrier effect for e-commerce, while never-
theless responding to a public policy need.
The role of the WTO in what concerns Internet regulation is
limited to its present competence. Even before any wide dis-
cussion and clear positioning of the WTO on this issue has
taken place, a case has been submitted and resolved. This
may serve as a sign that no extravagant new rules need to
be adopted. However, that is not to deny the fact that certain
specifics of e-commerce may need adaptation. Yet, any initia-
tive will have to ensure that it does not include matters that
have, up to now, been successfully dealt with through excep-
tions, i.e. ‘‘not regulated’’ unless and until the level of political
integration and compromise produces proposals equivalent to
the current arrangements.
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